

THE STATE OF PLAY US SPACE SYSTEMS COMPETITIVENESS

PRICES, PRODUCTIVITY, AND OTHER MEASURES OF
LAUNCHERS & SPACECRAFT

EDGAR ZAPATA
MAY 11, 2026

Zapata Talks NASA
zapatatalksnasa.com

Where I translate
NASA and the
space industries
techno-gibberish
and happenings
into almost English

Edgar Zapata on NASA
<https://edgarzapata.substack.com/>

edzapata999@gmail.com

What follows is NOT those blogs

Instead, this is...

DATA + CONTEXT

DATA

A. AWARDS, “PRIME” CONTRACTOR AWARDS, GOVTRIBE.COM, GAO, IG, ETC.

- ONLY PART OF THE TOTAL COST TO NASA, DoD, GOVERNMENT
- CLOSER TO THE “PRICE” OF PIECE PARTS TO A BUYER

B. NASA BUDGET DOCUMENTS, CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS, ETC. – TO DRAW OUT CIVIL SERVANT, PERSONNEL, GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT COSTS

C. NASA BUDGET DOCUMENTS, CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS, ETC. – TO DRAW OUT OTHER PROGRAM AND PROJECT PROCUREMENT DOLLARS, E.G., “SUPPORT CONTRACTORS”

- E.G., TOTAL BUDGET = “THE COST” SO “TOTAL BUDGET” MINUS A MINUS B = OTHER PROCUREMENT DOLLARS
 - E.G., $A + B + C = \sim$ THE TOTAL RESOURCES NASA SPENDS ON A PROJECT
-
- FLIGHT RATE, PAYLOAD, AND OTHER PUBLIC DATA
 - THE RESULT PRODUCED FOR THAT RESOURCE

CONTEXT

- MINIMALLY PROCESSED DATA, BUT — DISTILL FOR DETAIL, CONSISTENCY, APPLES-TO-APPLES
 - CAPABILITY —SAME ORBIT
 - DOLLARS —SAME KIND, NOMINAL OR INFLATION ADJUSTED
 - COSTS —SAME “WHAT,” “WHEN,” AND “WHO”
 - PRIME ONLY \$ ONLY, OR ALL PROCUREMENT &, OR TOTAL \$ (BUDGET/SPENT)
 - LAUNCH OR SPACECRAFT
 - UP-FRONT, NON-RECURRING, DEVELOPMENT OR LATER/FUTURE RECURRING, PRODUCTION, UNITS, OPS, FLIGHTS/MISSIONS
 - BOEING, OR SPACEX, OR AEROJET, ETC.


NASA BUDGET

NASA RESOURCES

Purchase Power Drop 1995 to **2025** = **21%**

Notes:

1. 2021 Bio/Phys. Sci. moved from ISS R&D to Sci. line. (Not one for one; ISS R&D drop 2X larger than new line)
2. Commercial LEO 2020 \$15M, 2021 \$17M
3. 11/1/2022 - Applies the latest [2022 NASA Inflation Tables](#). General US Inflation for 2021=7.0%, 2022=7.9% as of March 2022. But note that NASA's updated indices = 3.8% & 5.7% resp.




NASA RESOURCES

Purchase Power Drop 1995 to **2026** = **24%**


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LAUNCH

US Launchers



Total Launches

Growth Productivity


Competitiveness

- The DOT defines a commercial launch as a "launch that is internationally competed (i.e., available in principle to international launch providers) or whose primary payload is commercial in nature"; also FAA licensed launches. So, interpreting Starlink as "commercial in nature" it is included here. Cargo and crew to the ISS, and NASA science missions are competed and awarded on commercial terms as a service and licensed by the FAA, even if only competed nationally, so also included here.

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Commercial Orbital Space Launches To-Date

Data from US Department of Transportation (to 2017) & Others (2018-2026)




(1) "US Commercial/private" includes Falcon 9, incl. w. private crew, Atlas, with payloads such as Kuiper-sats, the new Vulcan rocket, etc. (2) 1st ULA DOD "Commercial" begins in 2018 as 1st competitive launch awards launch, though exact timing +/- some years.

Reusability

- The Falcon booster return success rate vs. attempts is:
 - 97.7% to drone ship
 - 99.0% to land
 - 97.9% overall
- For Falcon Heavy, 3-boosters are included. Points may overlap, e.g., 2 side boosters on flight 391, 5 reuses each, and each had a turnaround of 290 days. The core was new, and expended.

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
Launch Systems Reusability - SpaceX Falcon



An attempt to recover a booster starts at flight 14. Prior flights are test flights regarding return. The 1st successful return is on the 20th flight. The first successful reuse is on the 34th flight (incl. AMOS.)

Trendlines=25-pt moving avg. First flight (a new booster) = 0 reuse.

Number of Reuses of the Last 100 Falcons Launched





Reusability

- Falcon 9 1st stage/booster reuse appears to be topping out in the high-twenties.

Reusability


- Curiously and counterintuitively, long-term data since the first reuse of a Falcon 9 1st stage/booster tends to a wider range of turnaround times as the booster is newer. More wear and tear does not imply more work next time.
- **BUT** - In the last 100 launches, there is a slight leaning to more days between turnaround as a booster is reused more often. Only slight.



SpaceX Launch Rate

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of SpaceX launches



NASA SLS / ORION

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SLS/Orion Prime Contracts & Related Costs Obligated (~Spent) Through Early 2026 (billions, nominal \$)

Other = ~\$40.9B

*REMAINDER-Other SLS/Orion/Grd procurement \$, support contractors, program integ. & ops @MSFC, SSC, JSC (and other TBD \$), \$27.385 , 35%

ESTIMATE-SLS/Orion Government mang'mt/civil Service @JSC, MSFC & SSC, (excludes KSC, below), \$4.429 , 6%

SLS/Orion Ground/Launch Operations, procurement \$ and gov. mang'mt/civil service @KSC since 2011, \$9.194 , 12%

Prime Contracts = ~\$36.8B

Boeing ICPS since 2012 -Contract data, \$1.300 , 2%

Boeing Ares I, V & SLS since 2007 - Contract data, \$10.000 , 13%


Orbital ATK since 2007 -Contract data, \$4.400 , 5%

Aerojet Rocketdyne Contract #1 since 2006 -Contract data, \$2.100 , 3%

Aerojet Rocketdyne Contract #2 since 2015 -Contract data, \$3.200 , 4%

Aerojet SLS EUS Engines - Contract data, \$0.285 , 0%

Lockheed-Martin Orion since 2006 -Contract data, \$15.500 , 20%



*Prime contract data from govtribe.com reconciled with public budget data (budgets minus ground ops, typical % for government management, and prime contracts = the "REMAINDER").

- If you go looking after the big "prime" contractor awards and added up what NASA spent there at any time on SLS/Orion, you will still be missing about half the SLS/Orion dollars NASA spent.
- **Note!** This does not include mission / flight operations (JSC).
- **Note!** Space Flight Support (SFS) not included (mostly JSC).
- Note. Some funds 2019 forward would start to apply to "recurring" flight costs (Starting at Artemis III?), not development, but only minimally.

DOD

INCREASINGLY OPAQUE

OLDER PUBLIC DATA WEBSITES SHUTTERED

THE LAST SYSTEM ACQUISITION REPORT (SAR) WITH
DETAILED DATA WAS IN 2019


2022/2021 SAR AVAILABLE BUT ELIMINATED DETAILED
DATA

DOD NSSL

- As of Dec. 2019 SAR
- **Note!** The NRO also contributes funds to the NSSL program. These additional \$ are NOT included here.
 - NRO covers 25% of the fixed yearly payment to ULA.
 - This NRO amount is likely in the range of an additional \$300M a year.
- For comparison on unit costs, also see GAO-18-360-SP, pp.128, a unit cost of **\$342.54M** in 2018 dollars.
- **Note!** The apx. \$1B a year to ULA apart from services for a launch continues, even though at times thought to be phased out by 2020. There is now Launch Vehicle Production Services (LVPS) and Launch Operations Services (LOPS).
- **Pending** – further documentation and traceability on the fixed amount to ULA not included when announcing launch contract awards (but awards to SpaceX appear to be total amounts.)

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
National Security Space Launch (was EELV) Program Annual Funding vs. Quantity Procured



DOD NSSL

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National Security Space Launch (was EELV) Program Annual Funding




“Appropriators in a [report accompanying](#) the bill point out what industry and government officials have been saying for years: **that the development of commercial launch systems has substantially reduced the cost of launching satellites to orbit. The price of launches under the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, meanwhile, do not appear to be coming down.** The 2020 budget funded four launches for \$1.2 billion. The 2019 budget funded \$1.7 billion for five NSSL launches.”

spacenews.com July 16, 2020

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National Security Space Launch (was EELV) Program Annual Funding




SPACECRAFT

Spacecraft Development Costs

Costs = Procurement Price to NASA (includes Prime and non-Prime)

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Spacecraft Non-recurring Development, NASA Procurement \$ Only, \$M 2026\$




See backup

Spacecraft Per Unit Costs – \$ Thru Cost Phase as Indicated

Costs = Procurement Price to NASA (includes Prime and non-Prime)

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Spacecraft Recurring Price per Unit, NASA Procurement \$ Only, \$M 2026\$



Likely low est., re. Atlas V, "charges" and other uncertainties affecting this \$ est. and com'l crew "PCM" flts 1 & 2.

Apollo Command & Service Module

Apollo Lunar Module / Lander

Dragon 1.0, cargo

Cygnus enhanced, cargo

Dragon 2.0, crew & cargo

Starliner, crew & cargo

Orion


Spacecraft production, no related Ops.
Uncertainty.
Lo \$400M, Hi \$1,370M

Spacecraft Production, no related Ops.
Uncertainty.
Lo \$530M, Hi \$1,270M

Development Complete

Unlike other data points, for these, Spacecraft production and related Ops are included as a service, BUT like other data points, the launcher and it's costs are excluded. Dragon cargo and crew recurring -spacecraft only- may be higher or lower as subtracted launch "cost" contributions to "price" to NASA have uncertainty lower or higher.

Spacecraft production, no related ops. Estimate @1 unit/year (procure. \$ = prime+non-prime)
CM \$ mostly, SMs by ESA.



See backup

MORE DATA SOON?

- COMMERCIAL CREW
- COMMERCIAL STARSHIP
- NASA STARSHIP LUNAR LANDER
- BLUE ORIGIN LUNAR LANDER
- COMMERCIAL LUNAR PAYLOAD SERVICES (CLPS)

HEOMD'S Vision for Exploration

Make commercial human spaceflight to low-Earth orbit a robust, sustainable enterprise with many providers and a wide range of private and public users

Build a coalition of partnerships with industry, nations, and academia that will help us send astronauts to the Moon quickly and sustainably, together

Deliver more missions, more science, more technology, and more innovation at a better value to the American taxpayer

Make new discoveries, expand human knowledge, and push human presence deeper into the solar system

Return benefit to Earth


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

- NASA KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, ENGINEER 32+YRS, RETIRED 2021
 - SPACE SHUTTLE OPERATIONS 1988-2000
 - ADVANCED PROGRAMS, PROJECTS & TECHNOLOGY 2000-2021
- PUBLISHING THE ANNUAL “THE STATE OF PLAY - PRICES, PRODUCTIVITY, AND OTHER MEASURES OF LAUNCHERS & SPACECRAFT” (AT [ZAPATATALKSNASA.COM](https://zapatatalksnasa.com))
- [NASA INNOVATIVE ADVANCED CONCEPTS \(NIAC\) EXTERNAL COUNCIL](#) 2021-2027
- BLOGGING SINCE 2021 AT [ZAPATATALKSNASA.COM](https://zapatatalksnasa.com)
- 2022 NEW SPACE JOURNAL – “[A CHECKLIST FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE AND NASA](#)”
- 2023 ACADEMIA.EDU – “[UNDERSTANDING AEROSPACE MARKET SHIFTS BY FUSING TECHNOLOGY AND PRACTICES VIA GENETIC ALGORITHM](#)”
- 2024 PUBLISHED THE BOOK “[AN ENGINEER’S JOURNEY IN NASA: SPACE TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY ON THE FINAL FRONTIER](#)” (AVAILABLE ON AMAZON)
- SUBSTACK “EDGAR ZAPATA ON NASA” → [HTTPS://EDGARZAPATA.SUBSTACK.COM/](https://edgarzapata.substack.com/)

EDZAPATA999@GMAIL.COM

BACKUP

BOEING STARLINER



**July 2023
Total = \$1,467M**

- 1/30/2020 [BOEING TAKES \\$410 MILLION CHARGE](#) TO COVER POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL COMMERCIAL CREW TEST FLIGHT
- 10/27/2021 [BOEING TAKES \\$185 MILLION CHARGE](#) BECAUSE OF STARLINER DELAYS
- 07/27/2022 [BOEING TAKES ANOTHER CHARGE AGAINST EARNINGS FOR STARLINER](#) (\$93M)
- 07/26/2023 [BOEING HAS NOW LOST \\$1.1 BILLION ON STARLINER, WITH NO CREW FLIGHT IN SIGHT](#)
 - ...THAT THE STARLINER PROGRAM HAD TAKEN A LOSS OF \$257 MILLION
- 07/26/2023 [BOEING'S STARLINER LOSSES TOTAL \\$1.5 BILLION WITH NASA ASTRONAUTS STILL WAITING TO FLY](#)
 - ...A \$257 MILLION CHARGE IN [THE SECOND QUARTER](#) FOR ITS STARLINER
- 10/24/2024 [MORE "CHARGES"](#) (?\$250M, ALSO SEE [HERE](#)) AND THEN 01/23/2025 [BOEING PROJECTS ADDITIONAL STARLINER LOSSES IN FOURTH QUARTER](#)

CONTEXT, private sector partners contributed as much as 50% of development funds in the commercial cargo programs. These partnering approaches depend on the private sector partners investing, creating an incentive to later recover that investment from non-NASA customers.

ORION

- 2/4/2021 AIRBUS AWARDED €650 MILLION CONTRACT TO BUILD THREE MORE ORION SERVICE MODULES

Inflation

•A dollar in 1995, using the general US inflation indexes, would require **\$2.06** today for the same purchasing power, or using the NASA inflation indexes, **\$2.11**. Over time there is not much difference between the indices.

•NASA would need a little over \$2 in 2024 to purchase what \$1 purchased in 1995. That is, the NASA budget that kept up with inflation today would be just over twice the 1995 budget of \$14.5 billion.

•But, NASA's 2024 budget is less than this equivalent purchasing power. NASA's budget, to have the same purchasing power in 2024 as in 1995 should be about \$30.6 billion, but instead it is \$24.9 billion, or **19% less**.

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4/1/2024

Difference, NASA Inflation Index vs. General US Inflation

